This paper describes a formalism for cryptographic protocol simulation and analysis that integrates logic and process calculus components. Novel features include the comprehensive modeling of encrypted and unencrypted messages, an expressive message passing semantics and sophisticated constructs for modeling principals. Moreover, the seamless integration of inference rules for communication, reduction and information analysis supports formal proofs about the knowledge and behavior of principals, and about the properties of protocols.
Introduction
The comprehensive analysis of cryptographic protocols requires modeling the messages exchanged by principals, the knowledge held by principals and the behavior of principals [4,10,14, 15J. Logic-based techniques, e.g., BAN logic [5,6J and its derivatives [7, 16] ' model messages and the beliefs of principals. However, they do not provide mechanisms for capturing and reasoning about the behavior of principals. Also, protocols must be idealized, i.e., abstracted, before analysis. Idealizing a protocol is difficult and prone to misinterpretation and errors.
Process calculus techniques, e.g., Spi calculus [2,3], on the other hand, focus on the behavior of principals (agents in a process calculus [1, 13] ).
But they lack constructs for modeling the knowledge held by principals and reasoning about this knowledge. Thus, only limited properties can be proven about protocols.
The integrated approach described in this paper draws features from process calculus and logic based approaches. Process calculus components are used to formally model the behavior and evolution of principals using concurrent communicating agents. Logic components are employed to simulate protocols and reason about the knowledge and behavior of agents (principals), and about the properties of protocols. The integrated approach can prove that protocols are vulnerable to attacks, thereby complementing state enumeration techniques [11,12J used to identify protocol vulnerabilities.
The following section defines communication syntax and semantics. Next, principals are formally modeled as concurrent agents, as in process calculi. Sections 4 and 5 present inference rules for agent and protocol analysis. In Section 6, the Needham-Schroeder Protocol [8,9,15J and a "middle person" attack are used to illustrate the power of the formalism. Finally, Section 7 presents our conclusions.
Modeling Communication
Communication between principals in protocols is modeled as synchronous message passing between agents. The sender outputs a "message" that matches a "pattern" exposed by the receiving agent. This section describes the syntax and semantics of agent communication. The synchronous model can express asynchronous communications and complex, encrypted messages. We assume the existence of a basic type N AM E comprising an infinite set of names. This basic type is used to create unique keys, and data for messages and patterns. For example, nand m in Definition 2.1 are of type N AM E (n, mEN AM E). Note that the concatenation of keys can be used to model k of n protocols, e.g., Clipper Key Escrow.
Definition 2.2:
The key matching operator is defined by the following rules:
Messages are defined as nested tuples of "values" encrypted under a key. Values can be keys, messages, names (representing data) or "fresh names" (representing nonces and time stamps). Figure 1 . We now define the matching of messages and patterns, fundamental to agent communication.
Definition 2.5: The message-pattern matching operator ("') is defined by the following rules (V,Vi E VAL, P,Pi E PAT, key,keYi E KEY, mE MSG and n E NAME):
Modeling Principals
Modeling the behavior of principals is required for the comprehensive analysis of protocols. Most conventional techniques [5, 6, 7 ,16J concentrate on messages exchanged in protocols, but do not model the behavior of principals. Our approach, with its richer semantics, models messages and the behavior of principals. A "system" is defined as the concurrent composition of communicating "agents" that represent principals. A concurrent sequence (cseq) is the concurrent composition (<» of an annotated sequence and a concurrent sequence. The syntax for specifying systems of concurrent, communicating agents is presented in Figure   2 .
To illustrate the expressive power of the approach, we formally model the Needham-Schroeder Protocol [5, 15] shown in Figure 3 . Note that the conventional notation only describes the contents of messages and indicates the message senders and intended receivers. It does not specify the behavior of principals as the protocol progresses. 
Inference Rules
Inference rules specify a formal semantics of agent behavior. Three groups of inference rules are specified: (i) agent communication and reduction rules, (ii) agent knowledge rules, and (iii) system development rules. 
Protocol Analysis
The formal analysis of protocols involves modeling principals using the agent syntax, and applying the inference rules, In, Out, Comm, Chain and ChainBase, to simulate agent behavior and the inference rules, Knows, Extract and Construct, to reason about the knowledge held by agents as the protocol progresses.
As an example, we model and analyze
Step 1 of the NeedhamSchroeder Protocol where agent a sends agent 8 the unencrypted message {A, B} (Figure 3) receiving m. Figure 5 shows the sequence of rule applications. On instantiating the Out rule for agent a, we obtain: Figure 6 illustrates the proof for both parts. Note that proving "sl knows A" (resp. "SI knows B") requires testing the condition A E lstvs (resp. BE lstvs). 
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Three preconditions must hold for Extract: the equivalent agent s2 (i) must know the message, (ii) must know a decryption key and (iii) this decryption key must match the encryption key for the message.
Obviously, s2 knows the (unencrypted) message {A, B}. Furthermore, every agent, including s2, knows the matching key (nil in Definition 2.2) needed to unlock unencrypted messages.
Extract creates the equivalent agent s2 whose knowledge base (lstv'S'
contains {A, B} as well as A (and B), i.e.,
Since "s2 knows A (and B)" and s2 == s1, it follows that "sl knows A (and B)."
Analysis of the Needham-Schroeder Protocol
This section analyzes the well-known "middle person attack" on the Needham-Schroeder Protocol [4, 5, 8] . The vulnerability in the original protocol is expressed in terms of a message secrecy property. Next, the corrected protocol is formally specified and verified.
The original Needham-Schroeder Protocol can be viewed as two separate, interleaved protocols [8] . The first is used to obtain the other principal's public key from the server (Steps 1 and 2 for Kb and Steps 4 and 5 for Ka). The second, comprising Steps 3, 6 and 7, handles the actual communication between A and B and is vulnerable to the middle person attack. To analyze the vulnerability and the correction, we concentrate on the second interleaved protocol (Figure 7 ).
Middle Person Attack
The middle person attack involves an intruder (1) who participates in two interleaved runs of the protocol, the first involving communication between I and A and the second between I and B [8] . Figure 8 labels the steps in the first (resp. second) interleaved protocol as 1.3, 1.6 and 1.7 (resp. 2.3,2.6 and 2.7).
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Step 2. Figure 11 . Attempted attack.
Starting with the initial definitions of agents a, band i in Figure 9 , we prove that the Needham-Schroeder Protocol is vulnerable. Figure 9 shows the evolution of agents as the protocol progresses. The inference rules In, Out, Comm, Chain and ChainBase are applied, as illustrated in Section 5, to reduce the agents. Note that Figure 9 gives the agent descriptions after each communication step.
Examination of Figure 9 reveals that the nonce Nb (in boldface) is created by agent b in Step 2.6 and is stored in its lstv. After Step 2.6, agent i knows {Na, Nb}K a (boldface), but it does not know Nb because it does not know K;;l. These results are proved, as in Section 5, using the Knows and Extract rules.
After executing Step 1.6, the lstv of agent a contains {Na, Nb} Ka (boldface). Since a knows K;;l (boldface), it also knows N b ; this is proved using the Knows and Extract rules.
However, after Step 1.7, agent i has {Nb} Ki (boldface) in its lstv, Since agent i already knows K h :-1 (boldface), on applying the Knows and Extract rules, we can show t at it also knows Nb. Thus, "i knows Nb" is true, and the Needham-Schroeder Protocol is vulnerable to the middle person attack according to Definition 5.1. In Step 2.7, agent i exploits the vulnerability by sending {Nb} Kb to agent b, thereby impersonating a.
Revised Protocol
To prevent the middle person attack, nonce Nb must not be captured by intruder I. Therefore, the revised protocol [4,8,9J requires the identity of the contacted principal (B) to be included in the message sent in Step 6.
Note that the initiating principal A expects the identity of the principal to be included in the message it receives. If the identity that is received differs from what is expected, A rejects the message. Figure 10 shows the revised protocoL Note that the new information added to the protocol is underlined in Step 6. Figure 11 shows the attempted attack by intruder I. Steps 1.3 and 2.3 proceed as in the original protocol. However, in Step 2.6, B sends its identity B embedded in the encrypted message {B, N a, Nb} Ka to I. Since intruder I does not know K;;l, it cannot unlock the message and insert its own identity l. in place of B. All it can do is replay {B, N a , N b } Ka to A. Since A expects {L Na , Nd K a , it rejects the message sent by I and the attack fails.
Conclusions
The integrated approach described in this paper supports formal, yet natural translations of cryptographic protocols, eliminating the need for protocol idealization as in BAN logic. It also improves on process calculus methodologies (e.g., Spi calculus) by permitting the exhaustive modeling of messages and principals, thereby supporting comprehensive protocol analysis and verification.
Novel features of the approach include an expressive message passing semantics, sophisticated concurrency constructs and seamless integration of inference rules for agent communication, reduction and information analysis. The approach facilitates the analysis of cryptographic protocols in open, potentially hostile environments by making no assumptions about the honesty of principals.
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